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ARTICLES
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION'S
FIRST AMENDMENT VS. THE CANADIAN CHARTER
OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY
AS FORMS OF EXPRESSION
JUSTIN

A.

GIORDANO, ESQ.*

INTRODUCTION

This paper will seek to analyze and contrast the differences between
the American and Canadian approaches to pornography and obscenity, as well as the effect of the Internet on the dissemination of this
material.
Proponents of unrestrained expression in this area believe that such
expression is the true test of the highly revered and acclaimed freedom of speech clause prominently featured in the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution, and its Canadian counterpart: the Free
Expression Clause,1 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, 1982 R.S.C. Appendix II, No. 44, §2(b) (Can).
* The author is on the Business, Management & Economics faculty of Empire State College of the State University of New York. Professor Giordano specializes in Business Law and
the Legal Environment as well as International Law, International Business Law and Entertainment [and Media] Law, teaching at the undergraduate and graduate level. He has also taught at
the law school level in the capacity of visiting/adjunct Professor of International Law & Entertainment Law. He is licensed as an attorney at law in the states of New York, New Jersey and
Connecticut, and admitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, the Court of the Armed
Forces, the United States Court of Federal Claims, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit.
Professor Giordano is also a contributing columnist to two professional [law] monthly journals/
magazines as well as contributing articles to various general interest publications. Special acknowledgement to Mr. Joseph Michelucci, Q.C., a practicing attorney in Toronto, Canada, who
provided significant research contribution and authorship assistance pertaining to the "Canadian
law" component of this article.
1.

1 CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS,

Constitution Act, 1982 R.S.C. 1985,

Appendix II, No. 44, Sched. B, Pt I, s. 2 (Can.). The Free Expression Clause provides: "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:
a) freedom of conscience and religion;
b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and
other media of communication;
c) freedom of peaceful assembly; and
d) freedom of association.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2004

1

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2004], Art. 2

72

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:71

Canada, the United States' closest relative in the community of nations, adopted a new Constitution in 1982.2 This Constitution sought
to enshrine some of the highest ideals known to mankind, drawing
freely from the best that the world has to offer in legal and constitutional thought. It is no surprise that the United States Constitution
was scrutinized and drawn upon generously. In fact, some Canadian
legal scholars claim that they sought to improve on the venerated
American document, while avoiding what they may have judged to be
its pitfalls and shortcomings.3
Overall, the Canadian legal establishment's aim has steadfastly
been to protect free speech while incorporating safeguards designed
to protect against expression primarily offensive to females, minorities
and other groups historically perceived to have been unfairly treated.
But while the goal is indisputably laudable, the question that stubbornly arises at every at every turn is: when does this safeguard impede true freedom of speech and expression, even if that speech or
expression is hurtful, offensive or harmful to some or is in extremely
poor taste to others? The "slippery slope" argument has long since
gained cliche status, but nonetheless it is still considered a powerful
argument against restrictions on free speech.4
The pornography controversy is unlikely to just fade away. Indeed
with the advent of the Internet, the issue has once again been brought
to the forefront with renewed vigor. The United States Supreme
Court's latest ruling relating to this matter was handed down on June
26, 1997, in the Reno, Attorney General of the United States, v. American Civil Liberties Union decision (hereinafter Reno v. ACLU).5 The
case dealt with the dissemination of pornography and obscenity on the
Internet.
Those who oppose pornography remain steadfast in their belief that
freedom of speech (and expression) does not entail the unfettered,
unlimited, and uncontrolled dissemination of pornographic material.6
Furthermore, their contention is that most of the materials that are
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in its entirety: "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2. Id.
3. Robin West, The Feminist-ConservativeAnti-Pornography Alliance and the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on PornographyReport, 4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 681 (1987).
4. "Slippery slope" is a term used to describe the potentially easy segue way between a
safeguard to protecting a freedom and such a safeguard's possible impediment to expressing
such freedom.
5. Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
6. R. v. Hicklin, (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371.
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currently considered pornographic should instead be classified as ob-7
scene, thus outside the protective umbrella of the First Amendment.
Canada has had to grapple with this controversial and provocative
issue as well. However, as this paper will show, Canadians have approached this challenging and often treacherous area of law somewhat
differently than their American counterparts.
PORNOGRAPHY VS. OBSCENITY

Unlike many other democracies, freedom of expression has long
been a fundamental aspect of constitutional democracy. However, the
rights of freedom of speech and expression must always be balanced
against any limitation on certain types of expression that are deemed
to undermine society's sense of decency.
Pornography has been a very controversial form of expression; it
has come to symbolize a deep sense of immorality and decay to some
while representing ultimate liberation and a celebration of human sexuality to others. Some American feminist commentators have stated
that the "[g]ood pornography has value because it validates women's
will to pleasure. It celebrates female nature. It validates a range of
female sexuality that is wider and truer than that legitimated by the
non-pornographic culture. Pornography (when it is good) celebrates
both female pleasure and male rationality. '
On the other hand, the Canadian MacGuigan report stated that
"[t]he clear and unquestionable danger of this type of material is that
it reinforces some unhealthy tendencies in Canadian society. The effect of this type of material is to reinforce male-female stereotypes to
the detriment of both sexes." 9
Thus, this medium elicits an extremely mixed reaction; it has come
to be seen as both an expression of free will and as a great impediment to sexual equality and the objectification of the female personae.
The issue of pornography elicits very strong reactions from people
across the political spectrum as well, and these reactions have not
failed to get the attention of legislators in Canada and the United
States.
Both American and Canadian legislatures have struggled to define
where "good" pornography ends and obscenity begins. As a result,
Canadian and American courts have had to revisit the topic of sexually explicit material and obscenity on a number of occasions to refine
7. Reno, 521 U.S. at 874-75, 886.
8. West, supra note 3, at 696.
9. Report on Pornography by the Standing Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs, 18
MacGugan Report 4 (1978); (This is a Government of Canada Publication).
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what would otherwise be, and some contend still is, a rather vague
area of the law
THE RESPECTIVE LEGISLATION

The Canadian legislation is contained in the Canada Criminal Code,
a federal statute with equal application across the country. Section
163(8) of the Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, Ch. C-46 creates a

criminal offense for selling, exposing or possessing a publication
whose dominant characteristic is the "undue exploitation of sex" or

sex combined with any crime, horror, cruelty or violence.1"
By contrast, the United States does not have a national standard.

There is, however, a "three prong test" outlined in the Miller v. California decision which serves to determine whether the obscenity
threshold has been crossed.1 1
10. Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163(8) (1985) (Can.). "For the purposes of
this Act, any publication of dominant characteristic of which is the undue exploitation of sex, or
of sex and anyone or more of the following subjects, namely, horror, cruelty and violence, shall
be deemed obscene." See also, Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163(8) (1985)
(Can.).
"(1) Every one commits an offence who:
(a) makes, prints, publishes, distributes, circulates, or has in his possession for the purpose of publication, distribution or circulation any obscene written matter, picture,
model, phonograph record or other thing whatever, or
(b) makes, prints, publishes, distributes, sells or has in his possession for the purpose
of publication, distribution or circulation a crime comic.
(2) Everyone commits an offence who knowingly, without lawful justification or excuse,
(a) sells, exposes to public view or has in his possession for such a purpose any obscene
written matter, picture, model, phonograph record or other thing whatever;
(b) publicly exhibits a disgusting object or an indecent show;
(c) offers to sell, advertises or publishes an advertisement of, or has for sale or disposal,
any means, instructions medicine, drug or article intended or represented as a
method of causing abortion or miscarriage; or
(d) advertises or publishes an advertisement of any means, instructions, medicine, drug
or article intended or represented as a method for restoring sexual virility or curing
venereal disease or diseases of the generative organs.
(3) No person shall be convicted of an offence under this section if he establishes that the
public good was served by the acts that are alleged to constitute the offence and that the
acts alleged did not extend beyond what served the public good.
(4) For the purposes of this section, it is a question of law whether an act served the public
good and whether there is evidence that the act alleged went beyond what served the
public good, but it is a question of fact whether the acts did or did not extend beyond
what served the public good.
(5) For the purposes of this section, the motives of an accused are irrelevant.
(6) Where an accused is charged with an offence under subsection (1), the fact that the
accused was ignorant of the nature or presence of the matter, picture, model, phonograph record, crime comic or other thing by means of or in relation to which the offence
was committed is not a defence to the charge.
(7) In this section, "crime comic" means a magazine, periodical or book that exclusively or
substantially comprises matter depicting pictorially. . .(b) events connected with the
commission of crimes, real or fictitious, whether occurring before or after the commission of the crime.)
11. Miller v. California, 413 US 15, 39 (1973). The three prong test developed by the Court
was: "(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find
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THE TRANSFORMATION OF OBSCENITY: MORALITY VS. EQUALITY

In Canada the question of sexually explicit materials and obscenity
has undergone profound changes. The test evolved from an examination of whether the materials in question would "deprave and corrupt
those whose minds are open to such immoral influences" to whether
this type of material was "harmful"
to society and not simply a "lapse
12
inappropriate or good taste.
As expounded in R. v. Butler, the leading Canadian case in the area
of pornography as obscenity, the harm was characterized as having a
detrimental effect that placed "women (and sometimes men) in positions of subordination . . . [which] . . .run against the principles of
equality and dignity of all human beings." 13 The Butler court held
that "[h]arm in this context means that it predisposes persons to act in
an anti-social manner as, for example, the physical or mental mistreatment of women by men... or, .
the reverse. '"14
The conceptual notion of harm has had both its critics and its supporters. In this transformation from morality to equality, the Supreme Court of Canada has accepted a generalized and gender-based
theory of harm that would prohibit sexually explicit materials. This
theory is based on the idea that sexually explicit materials reinforce an
ideology of gender-domination or portrays female sexuality in a false
or degrading manner. However, such a generalized theory of harm
does not necessarily prove that certain types of sexually explicit material are actually harmful. Therefore, whether characterized as morality or as gender-based harm, a prohibition of sexually explicit
materials permits expressive activity to be suppressed. The public policy supporting such a prohibition is that sexually explicit materials are
inconsistent with a conventional standard of propriety, albeit one that
15
is more cherished in contemporary society.
In the United States, the relevant test is still the Miller standard.' 6
Under this test, sexually explicit material is obscene if: 1) the average
person, applying contemporary community standards would find that
the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; 2) the
work depicts in a patently offensive way sexual conduct specifically
that the work, taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."
12. Id. at 204.
13. R. v. Butler, (1992) 1 S.C.R. 452, 479.
14. Id. at 485.
15. Jamie Cameron, Abstract Principle v. Contextual Conceptions of Harm: A Comment on
R. v. Butler, 37 McGILL L.J. 1135, 1138 (1992).
16. Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
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defined by the applicable state law; and 3) the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value. 17 The first
prong of this test was adopted from the Roth v. United States18 deci-

sion and with the second prong, which adopts the standard of offensiveness, the American standard has not moved away from the

protection of morality, as it would appear that the Canadian standard
has done.

However, the question of obscenity as an equality issue was decided

in American Booksellers Association v. Hudnut.1 9 This case involved a

constitutional challenge to an Indianapolis civil rights ordinance that
defined pornography in terms of its injury to women and outlawed it
as a form of sex discrimination.2"
The Indianapolis ordinance,21 drafted by Andrea Dworkin and
Catherine MacKinnon, (two well renowned American feminist activists) created a civil remedy for anyone who could prove he or she was
harmed by certain defined conduct or content, specifically where the
conduct or content2 2 involved "graphic sexually explicit subordination
of women".2 3 It must be noted however, that this ordinance did not

constitute a prohibitive criminal law, but simply provided the opportunity for compensatory remedies after the fact and upon proof that

harm was inflicted on a plaintiff. In invalidating the ordinance at trial,
Judge Barker concluded that it was aimed at speech traditionally pro-

tected by the First Amendment, and as such was not directed specifically as obscenity.2 4

17. Id. at 39.
18. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
19. Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316 (S.D. Ind. 1984), affjd, 771F. 2d
323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
20. Id.
21. INDIANAPOLIS GENERAL ORDINANCE No. 35, § 16-3(q)(1)-(6) (1984). The ordinance, in
creating a civil remedy defined pornography as follows:
(1) Women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation; or
(2) Women are presented as sexual objects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped;
or
(3) Women are presented as sexual objects tied up or mutilated or bruised or bruised or
physically hurt, or as dismembered or truncated or fragmented or severed into body
parts; or
(4) Women are presented as being penetrated by objects or animals; or
(5) Women are presented in scenarios of degradation, injury abasement, torture, show as
filthy or inferior bleeding bruised or hurt in a context that makes these conditions sexual; or
(6) Women are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility or submission or
display.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. At 1326.
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Moreover, in her opinion, Judge Barker states that sex discrimination is not so compelling (i.e., a compelling state interest) as to outweigh the right of free speech. 5 It is interesting to note that the
plaintiffs also sought to rely on the child pornography case of New
York v. Ferber,2 6 a decision upholding a ban on child pornography.
The plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that the protection of women was
a compelling state a interest and analogous to the protection of children, and such an interest was sufficiently meritorious to override the
27
First Amendment free speech protection clause.
Judge Barker applied the classic Miller analysis in this case and held
that sex discrimination does not meet the compelling state interest test
nor the "clear and present, imminent danger" test,2 8 both of which
emanate from the strict scrutiny doctrine. Meetings the standards established by at least one of these tests is required to override the First
Amendment free speech provision. 29 From a Canadian perspective, it
could be argued that the analysis applied by Judge Barker, which has
grown out of the American jurisprudence and culminated in Miller, is
unduly narrow.
In Canada, if it can be shown that a type of sexually explicit material prohibited by statute actually caused sex discrimination, then
would at least get the same treatment as a person harmed by other
prohibited forms of speech such as defamation.3" Therefore, in Canadian jurisprudence, this decision would have been based on whether it
could be shown that sexually explicit material actually causes sex discrimination, rather than whether sex discrimination is important
enough to override the Canadian free speech provisions.
The danger with this type of ordinance, as the anti-censorship feminists have pointed out, is that it creates the impression that sex degrades women but not men; that men are raving beasts; that sex is
dangerous for women; that sexuality is male and not female; that men
inflict sex on women and that heterosexuality is somehow sexist because penetration is a sign of submission.3 1 Moreover, the defendant's
reliance on the Ferber decision coupled with the ordinance's strong
presumption of coercion merely reinforces the notion that women are
incapable of consent.32 As stated above, without conclusive proof that
this type of material actually causes sex discrimination coupled with
25. Id.
26. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
27. Hudnut, 598 F.Supp at 1332.
28. Rebecca Benson, Pornography and the First Amendment: American Booksellers v.
Hudnut, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S U. 153, 162 (1986).
29. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747.
30. Benson, supra note 29, at 168.
31. Id. at 171.
32. Id. at 171-72.

Published by History and Scholarship Digital Archives, 2004

7

North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 2 [2004], Art. 2

78

NORTH CAROLINA CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26:71

the fact that the ordinance made no mention of sexist non-sexually
explicit material that is far more common on television or in advertising, the Indianapolis ordinance was trying to enforce a conventional
standard of propriety.
In summary, S. 163 of the Canadian Criminal Code specifically prohibits certain types of pornography that depict the physical abuse of
women. 33 Violation of S. 163 constitutes a crime. In contrast, the Indianapolis ordinance did not directly prohibit any material from being
produced or sold, nor did it constitute a crime. 34 Instead, it merely
created a civil remedy for an aggrieved party who could prove harm
by the defined conduct or content previously described.
1. Obscenity in Canadian Case Law
The leading decision in the area of obscenity, with regard to pornography, is R. v. Butler. In that case, the accused was charged with
numerous counts of possessing and distributing obscene material
under S.163, and the Court was faced with deciding whether S. 163
infringed on the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by S.
2(b) 36 of the Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms, Constitution
44 and what test to apply in
Act, 1982 R.S.C. 1985 Appendix II, No.
37
defining "undue exploitation of sex."
Obscenity and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom
By its very nature, obscenity legislation will come directly in conflict
with the right to freedom of expression guaranteed by S.2(b) of the
Charter.38 However, S. 2(b) is subject to the limitation imposed by S.
123 of the Charterif it can be shown that there exists a "pressing and
substantial" reason to limit this right.3 9
The leading case in the area of freedom of expression is Irvine Toy
v. Quebec.' In this case, the Canadian Supreme Court developed the
test to determine whether an activity constitutes a form of protected
expression.4 1 The Court stated that, "[w]e cannot... exclude human
activity from the scope of guaranteed free expression on the basis of
the content or meaning being conveyed. Indeed, if the activity con33. Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C., Ch. C-46 § 163 (1995) (Can).
34. Id.
35. Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452, 460.
36. Constitution Act, 1982, R.S.C., App. II, No. 44 Sched. B, Pt. I, § 2 (1985) (Can). "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: . . . (b) freedom of thought, belief, opinion and
expression, including freedom of the press and other communications."
37. Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., Ch. C-46, § 163(8) (1995) (Can).
38. Constitution Act, at § 2.
39. Id. § 1.
40. Irvine Toy v. Quebec, 94 N.R. (S.C.R.) (1989).
41. Id. at 174.
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content and
veys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive
42
prima facie falls within the scope of the guarantee.
As far as pornography is concerned, the Supreme Court of Canada,
in Butler, overturned a Manitoba Court of Appeals decision that pornography should not be included under the ambit of protected expression.4 3 Thus, pornography is considered a protected form of
expression as long as it is not obscene. This limit was challenged as an
infringement on s. 2(b) of the charter.4 4 To this end, the Court divided
pornography into three basic categories: 1) material with explicit sex
and violence; 2) explicit sex without violence but which subjects people to degrading treatment; 3) explicit sex without violence that is not
degrading.4 5
Section 163(8) expressly prohibits the first category of pornography
and may prohibit some forms of pornography in the second category if
they exhibit "undue exploitation of sex.",4 6 In defining what types of
material would be prohibited in the second category, the Court stated,
"the portrayal of sex coupled with violence will almost always constitute the undue exploitation of sex. Explicit sex, which is degrading or
dehumanizing, may be "undue" if the risk of harm is substantial. Finally, explicit sex that is not violent and neither degrading nor dehumanizing is generally tolerated in our society and will not qualify as an
undue exploitation of sex unless it employs children in its
production."4 7
Furthermore, if the material is not considered obscene under this
definition, it will not become obscene by virtue of the manner in
which, or the audience to whom, it is exposed.4" From prior cases
there are two tests that the Court accepted in determining what types
of material portray an undue exploitation of sex: (1) the "community
standard of tolerance" test; and (2) the degrading or dehumanizing
test. The community standards test is not concerned not with what
Canadians would not tolerated being exposed to themselves. Rather,
the test is the degree of exposure they would find unacceptable for
other Candadians. 49 This standard is a very flexible standard and
changes with time. 50 For the most part, the interpretation of this standard is left to the discretion of the trial judge or the jury, and it is also
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 212.
Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452, 460 (Can.)
Constitution Act, at § 2.
Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452, 470 (Can.)
Canadian Criminal Code R.S.C., Ch. C-46, § 163(8) (1985) (Can).
Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452, 471 (Can.)
Id. at 465.
Id. at 465-66.
Id. at 466.
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important to note that the test is based on tolerance and not personal
taste.
Thus, the only guidelines expressly laid down to define "community
standard" are: (a) the standard must be a national standard and not
merely the standard of a small segment of the population; (b) the standard must reflect what a person would not tolerate another person

being exposed to and; (c) it must be based on tolerance and not
taste.51 All three components of the test must be met in order to declare the material in question obscene.52
According to the Canadian Supreme Court, the community standard test is more important than the degrading test.5 3 As the Court

recognized in Butler, these tests are not mutually exclusive tests; the
degradation test is encapsulated within the community tolerance test
such that, as suggested in prior jurisprudence, 4 if the material is considered degrading it will necessarily fail the community standard test.
Section 163 was deemed to infringe upon S. 2(b) of the Charter be-

cause the Court ruled that the type of expression in question need not
be redeeming in the eyes of the court, as long as the government's
purpose is to specifically restrict certain types of communications or
materials based on their content. However, S. 163 was saved by operation of s. 1 of the Charter, and the major motivating factor throughout the Supreme Court of Canada's application of the Oakes55 test
was the above-mentioned concept of harm.
In applying the proportionality component of the Oakes test, the
Court seems to have accepted a lower standard of proof regarding the
harm caused to society by pornography. This is due partly to the fact
that pornography is a form of expression whose main aim is economic
profit (which places it at the lower end of the expression spectrum) 56 .
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Towne Cinema Theatres v. The Queen, 18 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (1985).
55. The Oakes test, derived from R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R.103 (1985), provides a possible defense for the government after the plaintiff has proven that a possible defense for the government after the plaintiff has proven that a certain piece of legislation infringes on one of the
guaranteed rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. If a plaintiff proves that
their rights have been infringed, the government can save the legislation if it can show:
1) What the governmental or social purpose is that the impugned law or government action
was intended to achieve. Id at 135.
2) That this objective is one of substantial importance or pressing significance in a free and
democratic society, so s to warrant the infringement of constitutional rights. Id. At 138.
3) That the measure adopted by the government to obtain its objective is rationally connected to the end sought to be achieved. Id. At 106.
4) That the method chosen by the government to meet its objective places the least restrictions on the right in question and is proportional to the end sought to be achieved (proportionality test). Id. At 139.
56. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103, 104.
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Thus, in Butler, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted that if there
was a reasonable basis for concluding that harm will result, actual
proof of harm was not required.5 7
It is important to note that "the reasonable basis" test enunciated in
the Butler case which could effectively make certain forms of pornography illegal, are in sharp contrast to established American case law
which has consistently held that once material has been categorized as
pornographic but not obscene, it cannot lose its First Amendment
protection. Furthermore, even if one could make the case that harm
might result as a consequence of the dissemination of pornographic
material, unless it can be ascertained that such harm is imminent i.e.,
the Clear and Present Danger Test, the First Amendment shield remains in effect.58
Obscenity in American Case Law
As stated above, the leading American case in the area of obscenity
5 9 The three-part Miller test essentially
in Miller v. California.
comprises the same elements as the Canadian undue exploitation of sex
standard. 60 However, the individual prongs of each test differ in their
scope and application.
In Miller, the Supreme Court abandoned the "utterly without redeeming social value" test in the Memoirs case and adopted the three
part test referred to above. 61 However, it is interesting to note that
the Court reaffirmed that they recognize "that the States have a legitimate interest in prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene
material when the mode of dissemination carries with it a significant
danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients. 62 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the court added that the material must be patently
offensive and that the standard by which to determine whether material is obscene is a community standard and not a national one. The
community standard is one which recognizes that "[p]eople in different states vary in their tastes and attitudes..."63 With the use of this
language, it appears that the American standard is still very much
couched in terms of morality.
Since the first two parts of the test involve local communities and
state laws and are issues to be left to the juries, the Courts have gener57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Butler, 1 S.C.R. 452, 471.
Reno, 521 U.S. 844, 845.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 15.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 24 (citing Memoirs v. Mass. 383 U.S. 413, 419 (1966)).
Id at 19.
Id at 33.
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ally been unwilling to establish a national standard for obscenity. In
Hamling v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held

that disseminators of obscenity must adhere to differences in obscenity standards between the states. 64 In Smith v. United States, Justice
Stevens set forth his view of the obscenity problem by stating in his
dissent, "[i]n the final analysis, the guilt or innocence of a criminal
defendant in an obscenity trial is determined primarily by individual
jurors' subjective reactions to 65the materials in question rather than by
the predictable rules of law."
PUBLIC DECENCY VS. "HARM" TO SOCIETY

The Canadian and American approaches to obscenity are very different in two respects: the Canadian system is based on whether it can
be said that the materials in question would be harmful to society,
while the American system is based on public decency; and the "community" standard test in Canada is a national standard while in the
American jurisprudence it is a regional or state standard.66
As mentioned above, actually proving that the materials in question
are harmful to society is a difficult task indeed. The social science
data is inconclusive in this regard.67 However, the Supreme Court of
Canada is content to give the government the benefit of the doubt in
cases where there is a reasonable basis for the intent of the impugned
legislation. Toward this end, the Supreme Court of Canada relied on
the American case of Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton68 in supporting
the view that even though social science data is inconclusive, the government can quite reasonably determine that a connection does or
might exist between antisocial behavior and obscene materials. This
view was also supported by other Canadian cases as well.69 Moreover,
in the overwhelming majority of cases, the fact that pornography is a
form of expression that is motivated by economic profit. Thus restrictions on this type expression are "easier to justify than other
infringements.

",70

Proponents for the Canadian approach would present the following
argument: the difference between a regional community standard test
64. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
65. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 316 (1977) (Justice Stevens dissenting).
66. Joseph E. Scott, What is Obscene? Social Science and the Contemporary Community
Standard Test of Obscenity, 14 INTr'L J.L & PSYCHIATRY 29 (1991).
67. Augustine Brannigan, Obscenity and Social Harm: A Contested Terrain, 14 INr'L J.L &
PSYCHIATRY 1 (1991); see also William A. Fischer and Amy Barak, Pornography, Erotica and
Behavior: More Questions than Answers, 14 INT'L J.L & PSYCHIATRY 65 (1991).

68. Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
69. See e.g., R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697.
70. Butler ,1 S.C.R. 452, 482.
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and the national community standard is significant because the regional test is based on the principle that a person should not be unwillingly exposed to obscene material rather than protecting the right to
free speech. While it can be said that this approach better protects the
rights of citizens by its flexibility (what is obscene in Utah may not be
obscene in California) it would tend to reinforce the State's right to
suppress speech rather than protect a person's right to free expression.
With a harm based approach as adopted by the Canadian Supreme
Court, a national test is compulsory since it cannot be argued that a
type of sexually explicit material is harmful in part of the country but
not in another part of the country. Moreover, the community standard test also tends to invite the communities' prejudices into the test.
In terms of comparative analysis however, it is worth nothing that
under Canadian law, the comparable test to the American "compelling state interest" and "clear and present danger" tests (as required
by the strict scrutiny doctrine) is the "pressing and substantial" test,
derived from the Oakes case.71 The "pressing and substantial" test
mandates that if there is a reasonable basis that harm will ensue, then
this basis is sufficient to limit free expression.72 The reasonable basis
can be founded and predicated on social science, e.g., studies, experts,
etc., even if other science is inconclusive in the particular matter at
issue. Thus the notion of basing a decision which would result in limiting free speech and expression on admittedly inconclusive evidence
would be counter to the fundamental traditions of American jurisprudence, which it is generally believed, has served the American republic rather well.
Another area of marked difference between the two countries' approaches on this matter relates to the issue of a national standard being supreme and uniformly imposed on the entire nation. The United
States has long staunchly held to its deeply-rooted principle that the
individual "[s]tates retain all powers not expressly delegated to the
Federal government nor prohibited to them by the United States Constitution. ' 73 This principle is clearly enshrined in the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, representing one of the ten principles of the
Bill of Rights. Therefore, the prospect of a national standard for the
purpose of establishing constraints on free speech while eliminating
local input is essentially a foreign concept to the American legal tradition. Thus, setting the equivalent of a Canadian style national stan71.
72.
73.
tution,

Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697, 698 (citing R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103).
R. v. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. 103, 104 (1986).
U.S. CONsT. amend. X. ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constinor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved respectively, or to the people.").
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dard in the United States would undoubtedly prove to be a most
challenging proposition.
OBSCENITY IN CYBERSPACE

The debate over pornography and obscenity has been brewing to a
boil in the recent past over the role pornography and obscenity occupy on the Internet. As alluded to earlier, camps on both sides of
this issue have emerged, energized their troops, and applied as much
political pressure as their respective resources afforded them. To the
delight of some and consternation of others, the heated debate
culminated with the enactment of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996 (hereinafter CDA or Act).7 4 It should be noted that this law
was part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 75 The CDA sought
through two of its provisions to protect minors from harmful material
on the Internet.76
Title 47 U.S.C.A. Sec. 223 (a)(1)(B)(ii) criminalizes the "knowing"
transmission of obscene or indecent messages to any recipient under
the age of 18, whereas Section 223 (d) prohibits the "knowing" sending or displaying to a person under the age of 18 of any message that,
in context, depicts or describes, in terms "patently offensive" as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs".77 The CDA further stipulated that a violation of

either statute could result in up to a $250,000 fine and/or two years in
prison.78 The ink was barely dry on this Act when a consortium of
Internet users, publishers, and civil liberties advocates (including the
ACLU) filed a complaint seeking to have these provisions struck
down as unconstitutional and in flagrant violation of the First
Amendment.7 9

The case wound its way up to the United States Supreme Court,
and Reno v. ACLU was argued on March 19, 1997 and decided on
June 26, 1997.80 The Court, in a 7 to 2 vote, struck down the two provi-

sions in question."1 It held that: "the CDA's indecent transmission
and patently offensive display provisions abridge the freedom of
speech protected by the First Amendment., 82 The Court concluded
that this would be punitive in its "application and a content based
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

47 U.S.C.A. §. 223 (2000).
Id.
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
Id. at 845.
47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (2000).
Reno, 421 U.S. 844.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 845.
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blanket restriction on speech."83 More specifically they stated that the
CDA cannot be applied to "the Internet" a medium that, unlike radio,
receives full First Amendment protection, and cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time place and manner regulation because it is a
content based blanket restriction on speech.84 The time, place and
manner analysis has been held constitutional in terms of being a limited, tailored, and non-content based restriction on freedom of speech,
but this standard clearly is not applicable here.
The Court also pointed out that the United States Government's
right to investigate and prosecute the obscenity and child pornography
activities is absolutely preserved, and in no way encumbered by this
decision.85 Obscenity and child pornography are already illegal and
subject to criminal prosecution under current Federal Law and the
various State criminal codes, thus negating the need for new legislation to address those concerns. This decision is not surprising given
the historical reluctance by the United States Supreme Court to impose undue restrictions on free speech, including pornographic
material.
As of this date, the Canadian Supreme Court has not had to adjudicate a case similar to or closely resembling the above. In terms of a
more comprehensive comparison and analysis however, it must be
stressed that a website operator will still be held criminally liable for
posting obscene material on the Internet. The community standard
component of the Miller "three-prong" test remains in fully enforceable and unaffected by the Reno v. ACLU decision.86 Therefore, any
website operator posting material on the Internet must be mindful of
the critical issue of jurisdiction (vis-a-vis the community standard test
applicable to that jurisdiction). In fact, if a neighboring state can
prove that the website operator (in putting up a website outside its
boundaries) creates jurisdiction within the home state, then the criminal laws of the home state would apply to the content of the website.87
To illustrate the point, in United States v. Thomas 46, the operators
of a pornographic website in California were charged with transporting obscene materials via a common carrier, and transporting obscene
material in interstate or foreign commerce.88 They were convicted in
a Tennessee Court applying the local community standard rather than
that of the defendants' home state of California.89 One of the two
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 864.
Id. at 872.
Id. at 844.
United States v. Thomas, 74 F. 3d 701, 705-06 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 711.
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defendants in that case was also convicted in Utah on the same
charges, this time applying Utah's community standard.9 0
In Canada, a theoretical defendant facing similar charges as the defendants in United States v. Thomas, would have to be in compliance
with a single national standard. Therefore, the possibility of a defendant being convicted in one province and not another becomes an effective impossibility. However, a scenario could result in which a
defendant is found guilty of transmitting or transporting obscene material in one State while not guilty in a sister State, remains a distinct
possibility in the United States.
CONCLUSION

The comparative analysis presented indicates that the line between
pornography an obscenity is not as clearly delineated in Canada as it
is in the United States. Important points of distinction between the
American and the Canadian approach to pornography exist and are
worth re-emphasizing. In the United States the Supreme Court extends full First Amendment freedom of speech protection to pornography, except as it pertains to child pornography.9" In Canada
however, the barrier between pornography and obscenity is more porous and allows for content-based restrictions, as prescribed in the
"Pressing and Substantial Interest" test. Therefore, there is a greater
possibility for the imposition of restrictions on this form of speech and
expression. Furthermore, the concept of restricting or limiting speech
and expression, premised solely on inconclusive social science, in order to avoid future social or other harm which may occur (i.e. the
lower evidentiary threshold of the "Pressing and Substantial Interest
test"), 92 runs generally counter to American legal tradition and
thought. Naturally the notorious "yelling fire" in a crowded theatre is
not protected speech nor is speech that runs afoul of the "Clear and
Present Danger" test. The fundamental principle however, remains
unaltered.
Lastly the notion of group rights is also not one that is well received
by American courts. Conversely, the Canadian approach which embraces the concept of "social harm." This approach is at least partially
anchored on group rights and the extension of preferential treatment
to some but not others.93 In fact, it would appear that the Canadian
approach could make its courts, including the Supreme Court of Canada, more susceptible to pressure brought on by the political whims
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 845.
Keegstra, 3 S.C.R. 697, 698 (citing R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103).
ParisAdult Theatre, supra, note 68.

https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol26/iss2/2

16

Giordano: The United States Constitution's First Amendment vs. The Canadian

2004] OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY AS EXPRESSION

87

of the times. The pornography versus obscenity controversy could
easily be utilized as a legal vehicle to attain certain socio-political
goals, and there is preliminary evidence to indicate that such might be
occurring in Canada.
Indeed the Canadian pornography and obscenity laws strongly
favor females by structuring the enforcement of those laws in a manner designed to overwhelmingly and in almost comprehensively protect those groups.94 Although the goal expounded above may be
highly commendable, without the benefit of irrefutable evidence demonstrating that individual members of a given group are in imminent
peril, and not simply the victims of ridicule, humiliation, crudeness,
and sexual debasement, then letting the justice system take sides is
fraught with dangers and can often lead to unforeseen consequences.
It should always be remembered that "harm" to either an individual
or a group is ultimately a criminal matter, and once evidentiary proof
has been presented that a criminal act has been committed, criminal
statutes and civil remedies will be readily available to the injured
party.
Essentially this comparative analysis has uncovered a number of
differences, some significant while other less so. However similarities
also abound between the two nations in this area of law. They are
founded on the common belief that free speech, be it enshrined in the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution or in S. 2(b) of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, is fundamental and
vital to the growth, prosperity and vibrancy of these two neighboring
countries.

94. Canadian Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 163(8) (1985) (Can.).
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